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ABSTRACT 
Past studies argue that states abide by international human rights laws because the ratification of 
human rights treaties elicits public demand for compliance. Yet, the extent to which human rights 
treaties affect public support for compliance is unclear. At times, legalization of norms seems to 
elicit substantial public support for compliance, but at other times, legalization seems to have little 
effect. This study incorporates the life cycle of norms to arrive at a deeper understanding of the 
conditions in which international legal commitments to human rights generate public support for 
compliance with human rights norms. Using a series of survey experiments, this study finds that 
the effect of legalization on public support depends on the internalization of the norm itself. When 
a norm is emerging, legalization garners greater public support. When the norm is internalized, 
legalization does not always generate greater public support. In a sense, state commitment and 
norm internalization have substitutable effects on eliciting public support for compliance. This 
study also uses text analysis to explore the causal mechanisms through which international law 
causes greater public support for compliance. Laws of high obligation elicit public support by 
generating concerns over the state’s reputation, regardless of the norm’s life cycle. These findings 
suggest that policymakers and human rights advocates hoping to elicit greater public support for 
compliance with human rights norms should invest their political capital and financial resources 
on legalizing emerging norms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Can international law cause greater state compliance with 
human rights norms in the absence of centralized enforcement? If so, 
how? Due to the decentralized nature of international law, many have 
asked why states comply with international law and whether 
international legal commitments can lead to greater compliance with 
human rights norms.1 Scholars have looked to domestic politics to 
suggest several domestic compliance mechanisms. Some studies 
suggest that human rights treaties empower domestic actors such as 
the courts and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to ensure 
greater compliance with human rights norms post-ratification.2 On the 
other hand, some studies examine whether international human rights 
treaties can shift public perception of human rights norms and thereby 
pressure policymakers to comply through a constituency-driven 
domestic compliance mechanism.3 The constituency-driven domestic 
                                               
 1  See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 
(1995); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Robert Bork, 
The Limits of “International Law”, 18 NAT’L INTEREST 3 (1989-90); Francis A. Boyle, 
The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism between International Law and International 
Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193 (1980); George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News 
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996); Oona A. 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); 
Stanley Hoffman, The Role of International Organization: Limits and Possibilities, 10 INT’L 
ORG. 357 (1956); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (book review); Jana Von Stein, Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? 
Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611 (2005). 
 2  See, e.g., SONIA CARDENAS, CONFLICT AND COMPLIANCE: STATE 
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURE (2007); OSCAR 
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1991); SIMMONS, 
supra note 1; HEATHER SMITH-CANNOY, INSINCERE COMMITMENTS (2012); Emilie 
M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The 
Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1373 (2005); Eric Neumayer, Do 
International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 925 (2005); Emilia J. Powell & Jeffrey K. Staton, Domestic Judicial Institutions 
and Human Rights Treaty Violation, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 149 (2009). 
 3  See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights 
Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 110 (2014) 
[hereinafter Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights]; Xinyuan Dai, Why 
Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363 (2005); Sarah Kreps 
& Geoffrey Wallace, International Law, Military Effectiveness, and Public Support for Drone 
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compliance mechanism suggests that by affecting public opinion, 
international law gives policymakers an incentive to comply with 
international human rights law even without the traditional 
mechanisms for compliance that domestic law enjoys.4 
To test the constituency-driven compliance mechanism, 
several studies use survey experiments to examine whether the 
existence of an international agreement shifts public support for 
compliance with human rights norms.5 While some studies find that 
the ratification of international law shifts public attitudes,6 others do 
not find that treaty ratification has a significant additive effect in 
eliciting public demand for compliance.7 This study theorizes that the 
                                               
Strikes, 53 J. PEACE RESEARCH 830 (2016); Tonya L. Putnam & Jacob N. Shapiro, 
International Law and Voter Preferences: the Case of Foreign Human Rights Violations, HUM. 
RTS. REV. (2017); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes toward 
Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105 (2013) [hereinafter Wallace, 
International Law and Public Attitudes]; Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, Martial Law? Military 
Experience, International Law, and Support for Torture, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 501 (2014) 
[hereinafter Wallace, Martial Law]; Adam S. Chilton, The Laws of War and Public 
Opinion: An Experimental Study (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. Of Law and Econ 
Research Paper No. 687, 2014), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2353&context
=law_and_economics [hereinafter Chilton, The Laws of War]; Michael Tomz, 
Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs (Stanford University 
Research Paper, 2008), https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/Tomz-IntlLaw-
2008-02-11a.pdf; Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, The Reputational Consequences of International 
Legal Commitments (Rutgers University Niehaus Center for Globalization and 
Governance Research Paper, 2014), 
https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-
repository/public/reputation_paper_princeton2015.pdf [hereinafter Wallace, The 
Reputational Consequences]. 
 4 See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3, at 
112–13. 
 5 See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3; 
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, International 
Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Chilton, The 
Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, 
supra note 3. 
 6 See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3; 
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 
3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3. 
 7 See, e.g., Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3 (finding that general appeals 
to the morality of human rights norms elicit the same degree of public demand for 
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life cycle of norms can account for the difference and uses survey 
experiments in the United States and South Korea to test the theory 
and arrive at a deeper understanding of when human rights treaties 
generate public support for compliance with human rights norms. 
The study’s findings can be summarized as follows. First, when 
a human rights norm is emerging, strong international legal 
commitments generate greater public support for compliance than 
weak commitments. When a human rights norm is internalized, 
stronger state commitments do not always generate greater public 
support than weaker commitments. In a sense, state commitment and 
norm internalization have substitutable effects on eliciting public 
support for compliance. These findings have broader policy 
implications in that, when a norm is emerging, human rights advocates 
and policymakers may generate greater public support for compliance 
by ratifying international human rights treaties of high obligation that 
commit the state to observe the emerging norm, but they should 
expect laws of low obligation to do little in eliciting greater public 
support. 
Second, the study finds cross-national differences between the 
U.S. and South Korea that suggest the limits of the effects of 
international law on public opinion in certain parts of the world. Unlike 
the U.S., where legalization can inspire even greater support for 
compliance with an internalized norm, in South Korea, stronger 
international legal commitments are superfluous if the commitments 
are merely codifying already recognized norms of state behavior. Such 
cross-national differences highlight how different regions of the world 
have varying conceptions of international law and human rights norms. 
These differences should be taken into account before generalizing 
past and future findings on international law and public opinion. 
Third, the study uses text analysis to examine the causal 
mechanisms through which international law elicits public support for 
                                               
compliance with human rights norms as international legal commitments); Putnam 
& Shapiro, supra note 3 (finding that general appeals to customary international 
norms elicit greater public demand for compliance than ratification); Wallace, 
International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3 (finding that the level of legal 
commitment makes no difference in the degree of public distaste for torture). 
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compliance in the U.S. The analysis reveals that laws of high obligation 
elicit public support by staking the state’s reputation, regardless of the 
norm’s level of internalization. These findings make evident for future 
scholars the advantages of using innovative quantitative approaches to 
analyze survey responses. 
II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS 
International treaties and interstate agreements comprise the 
vast majority of international law, 8  but because states must first 
consent to be bound by such treaties and agreements, international law 
is often said to lack force.9 States can also opt to withdraw consent and 
reverse legal commitments that they have made previously.10 Skeptics 
theorize that states sign international laws they are already predisposed 
to follow, and international law is merely a reflection of state 
preferences rather than a tool capable of changing state behavior.11 Put 
differently, the legislative process or the process behind ratifying 
international law suggests that international law merely has an 
epiphenomenal effect.12 
At the same time, the judicial process of international law is 
also decentralized since states are their own judge and interpreter of 
                                               
 8 This study’s scope does not extend to customary international law. The 
definition of international law can be broadened to include “customary international 
law” or consistent patterns of state behaviour, but customary international law does 
not bind states that persistently object to the custom. See Tomz, supra note 3. 
 9 See, e.g., RAYMOND ARON, PEACE WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 820 (1981) (“International law can merely ratify the fate of arms and the 
arbitration of force.”); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 688 (6th ed. 1985) (states “are always anxious 
to shake off the restraining influence that international law might have upon their 
foreign policies, to use international law instead for the promotion of their national 
interests”); Bork, supra note 1; Boyle, supra note 1; Downs et al., supra note 1; 
Hoffman, supra note 1; Von Stein, supra note 1. 
 10 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581–
82 (2005). 
 11 See, e.g., ARON, supra note 9, at 820; MORGENTHAU, supra note 9, 688; 
Bork, supra note 1; Boyle, supra note 1; Downs et al., supra note 1; Hoffman, supra 
note 1; Von Stein, supra note 1. 
 12 See Hoffman, supra note 1. 
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international law. As long as states are sovereign, they can refuse to be 
taken to court against their will. While international courts may help 
adjudicate disputes at times, the fact remains that no state is forced to 
appear before an international court. States that commit to compulsory 
jurisdiction of international tribunals usually do so with the key 
reservation that they retain the right to withdraw.13 Additionally, the 
executive process of international law lacks force since there is no 
world police monitoring and enforcing compliance with international 
law. 14 Although there is an executive branch enforcing compliance 
with domestic statutes, there is no centralized enforcement body that 
is analogously tasked with the enforcement of international law. 
Yet, even the most ardent skeptics recognize that international 
law compliance is fairly widespread.15 As Louis Henkin once noted, 
“almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”16 So why do 
states comply with international law? Rationalists argue that mutual 
gains from cooperation ensure self-enforcing compliance in the realm 
of international trade law and the laws of war. 17  However, such a 
mechanism does not adequately explain compliance with human rights 
law. Just because one state does not comply with the stipulations of a 
human rights treaty does not incentivize another state to renege on its 
commitment to human rights in order to punish the noncompliant 
state. There are no mutual gains to be shared or lost with human rights 
treaties. 
                                               
 13  See Tomz, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that the U.S. exercised such a 
reservation at the International Court of Justice in the infamous Nicaragua case in 
1984). 
 14 Id. at 4–5. 
 15 See Downs et al., supra note 1, at 380–81. 
 16 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 
(2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
 17 See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1; JAMES D. MORROW, ORDER 
WITHIN ANARCHY: THE LAWS OF WAR AS AN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION (2014); 
Richard B. Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DENV. J. INTL’L L. & 
POL’Y 471 (1989); Downs et al., supra note 1. 
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A. Domestic Sources of Compliance 
Scholars have focused on domestic sources of compliance.18 
Professor Beth Simmons of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, who authored MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, argues that 
signing a treaty explicitly guaranteeing a human rights norm changes 
public perception of the human rights norm. 19  Segments of the 
domestic constituency are subsequently motivated to secure their 
newly promised right. 20  This shift in attitude among constituents 
regarding the human rights norm incentivizes civil society to advocate 
for and courts to ensure compliance with codified norm.21 Others 
explore the possibility of a constituency-driven domestic compliance 
mechanism in which policymakers pay an electoral cost for reneging 
post-ratification because treaties reshape public attitudes regarding 
international human rights norms.22 
Unfortunately, studies using survey experiments to test 
whether international law causes respondents to support compliance 
with human rights norms codified in international law have produced 
mixed results. Some forms of international law for some norms appear 
to foster greater public demand for compliance,23 while others do not 
                                               
 18 CARDENAS, supra note 2; SCHACHTER, supra note 2; SIMMONS, supra note 
1; SMITH-CANNOY, supra note 2; Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, 
supra note 3; Dai, supra note 3; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 2; Kreps & 
Wallace, supra note 3; Neumayer, supra note 2; Powell & Staton, supra note 2; Putnam 
& Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; 
Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra 
note 3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3. 
 19 SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 80–81. 
 20 Id. at 135. 
 21 Id. at 129–30, 135. 
 22 See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3; Dai, 
supra note 3; Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, 
International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; 
Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 3; Wallace, The Reputational 
Consequences, supra note 3. 
 23 See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3; 
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, International 
Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Chilton, The 
Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, 
supra note 3. 
2019 Legalization and Norm Internalization: An Empirical Study 7:2 
345 
seem to elicit an additional effect on public demand.24 Given these 
diverging findings, a better theory of when international legal 
commitments affect public perceptions is warranted, especially 
considering how courts, activists, and elected officials all rely on some 
public support in order to ensure greater compliance with human 
rights norms.25 
B. The Puzzle 
Some studies examining the effect of international human 
rights law in shifting public opinion show that a high level of legal 
commitment to a human rights norm—in the form of an international 
human rights treaty—is superfluous in shifting public opinion.26 A 
general appeal to morality,27 a mere mention of existing human rights 
standards,28 or a weak state commitment to abide by human rights 
standards 29  have the same effect in shifting public opinion as an 
international law of high obligation that commits a state to observing 
said human rights norms. To elaborate further, Professor Adam 
Chilton of the University of Chicago Law School argues in his work 
The Laws of War that general appeals to the norm against airstrikes that 
result in the loss of civilian life elicit similar shifts in public opinion as 
an international law that commits the state to refrain from such 
airstrikes. 30  In another study, varying levels of commitment by a 
foreign state to an international human rights norm against forced 
labor do not alter public perceptions of the state.31 Meanwhile, laws of 
high and low obligation to international norms against torture do not 
cause significant differences in public distaste for torture.32 In sum, 
                                               
 24 See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3; 
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 
3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3. 
 25 See generally James Ron, Introduction to Special Issue on “Public Opinion Polling 
and Human Rights”, 16 J. HUM. RTS. 257 (2017). 
 26 See generally Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra 
note 3; Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3. 
 27 See Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
 28 See Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 14. 
 29 See Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3, at 127–28. 
 30 Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3, at 3. 
 31 Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 32 Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3, at 127–28. 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:2 
346 
according to these studies, laws of high obligation that commit states 
to abide by human rights norms are largely redundant in influencing 
public opinion and therefore unnecessary to induce state compliance 
from the “bottom-up.”33 
Consequently, these studies challenge the common 
presumption that binding measures are more effective than 
nonbinding measures.34 Although there is some scholarship that claims 
that weak legal commitments can be as influential as strong 
commitments, 35  the aforementioned studies undercut the broader 
literature on legal obligation that stresses the level of state 
commitment.36  The broader literature outlines three dimensions of 
legalization: obligation, precision, and delegation. 37  Obligation, the 
focus of this study, is the degree to which states are bound by or 
committed to a particular international law.38 Simply put, while some 
laws are “‘hard law[s]’” that use the language of “‘[m]ust,’” other “‘soft 
law[s]’” use the language of “‘should.’”39 Laws of low obligations (i.e. 
soft laws) entail a weaker commitment, and laws of high obligations 
(i.e. hard laws) are usually codified in concrete terms and entail a strong 
commitment.40 Differences in obligation are expected to have varying 
                                               
 33 Id. at 106. 
 34 Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3, at 18; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 
3, at 15–16; Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3, at 135. 
 35  See generally DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE 
ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2000) 
(finding that non-binding norms can lead to state compliance). 
 36 See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A 
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); SHELTON, supra note 35; Kenneth W. Abbott 
et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 17 (2000); Kenneth W. Abbott & 
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 426 (2000). 
Cf. Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L 
ORG. 761 (2001) (finding that international institutions are rationally designed to vary 
in five key dimensions such as control and flexibility, which are similar to the level 
of state commitment). 
 37 Abbott et al., supra note 36, at 17. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
273, 274 (2010) (quoting Dinah Shelton, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 119–43 
(Edith Brown Weiss ed., American Society of International Law 1997)). 
 40 See Simmons, supra note 39. 
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effects in altering public opinion.41 However, the above studies suggest 
that legal obligation does not differentially affect public support for 
compliance. 
On the other hand, different studies find that the level of 
obligation does have a differential effect on public opinion. These 
studies find that only strong levels of state commitment to abide by 
human rights norms can elicit public support for compliance and that 
weaker commitments cannot elicit similar public support for 
compliance.42 For instance, one study finds that the public is swayed 
towards compliance by an explicit ratification of a human rights treaty 
concerning the solitary confinement of prisoners but is not similarly 
swayed by general appeals to the same human rights norm.43 Another 
study on treaty noncompliance and future cooperation arrives at a 
similar conclusion regarding the divergent effects of strong and weak 
legal commitments to human rights.44 These results are in accord with 
the broader scholarship that stresses the limitations of nonbinding 
legal commitments and argues for the importance of laws that entail a 
high level of obligation.45 
What is clear from the diverging findings is that state 
commitments to human rights may not have a singular effect on public 
support for compliance. There needs to be a more developed theory 
of when international legal commitments lead to greater compliance 
with human rights norms and when international legal commitments 
are unnecessary. When does the level of commitment matter in shifting 
public support for compliance? If nonbinding legal commitments have 
the same effect as binding international law in shifting public support, 
does it matter that states ratify treaties entailing a strong legal 
commitment as opposed to a weak legal commitment? If only certain 
                                               
 41 Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3, at 13–15. 
 42 See generally Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3; 
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, International 
Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Chilton, The 
Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, 
supra note 3. 
 43 Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3, at 133. 
 44 Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3, at 20. 
 45 See, e.g., GUZMAN, supra note 36, at 211–13; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 36, 
at 422–26. 
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norms require binding commitments to generate public support for 
compliance, which ones, and why? Identifying which human rights 
norms require strong legal commitments has far reaching policy 
implications as well. Understanding when strong commitments shift 
public support for compliance can help focus the limited political 
capital and financial resources of policymakers and human rights 
advocates hoping to elicit greater public support through the 
ratification of international human rights treaties. This study turns to 
norm internalization to develop and empirically test a theory of when 
the public supports compliance with international human rights laws 
and thereby provides better insight into state compliance with human 
rights norms. 
C. Norm Internalization 
Norms are shared ideas and expectations about the appropriate 
behavior for actors—what actors ought to do.46 The focus of this study 
is a particular subset of norms, namely international human rights 
norms, or ideas and expectations about the appropriate behavior for 
states in relation to their human rights practices. There are numerous 
examples of prominent international human rights norms such as non-
refoulement, the practice that forbids states from returning asylum 
seekers to their country of origin where they will then face 
persecution.47 Because non-refoulement is a prominent, well-established 
norm, its non-derogable nature is relatively clear. 48  However, well-
established norms “do not appear out of thin air” but are developed 
by norm entrepreneurs through a maturation process that transforms 
new ideas about how states should behave into universally recognized 
norms.49 
Accordingly, Professors Martha Finnemore of George 
Washington University and Kathryn Sikkink of the Harvard Kennedy 
School of Government, who co-authored International Norm Dynamics 
                                               
 46 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 892 (1998). 
 47 See generally Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement, 13 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 533 (2001). 
 48 Id. at 538–41. 
 49 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 46, at 896. 
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and Political Change, outline a “life cycle” for norms: emergence, cascade, 
internalization. 50  During norm emergence, what a particular norm 
entails is unclear, and norm entrepreneurs attempt to better define the 
norm and persuade a critical mass of actors to accept the emerging 
norm.51 Persuaded actors then build towards a “tipping point,” which 
results in a cascade of states willing to join the new normative regime 
that carries with it clear ramifications.52 Finally, norm internalization 
occurs after the cascade, at which point the norm is taken for granted 
and its meaning is no longer subject to debate.53 When the cascade is 
complete, the norm is said to have become internalized or 
established.54 Similarly, in legal scholarship, Professor Harold Koh of 
Yale Law School, who authored How Is International Human Rights Law 
Enforced?, describes norm internalization as a process in which norms 
become a part of the state’s internal value system.55 
D. The Theory 
In light of the literature on norm internalization, this study 
argues that taking account of norm internalization can help address 
when international legal commitments elicit public demand for 
compliance. Past legal scholarship has alluded to the need to take 
seriously norm internalization as well. 56  Koh suggests that 
legalization—what he terms the “horizontal” or “international legal 
process” between states—only provides a partial picture. 57  Norm 
internalization—what he terms the “vertical” or “transnational legal 
process” within states—is equally important in explaining 
compliance.58 To elicit compliance, a norm must become internalized 
through “vertical domestication” such that actors come to recognize 
                                               
 50 Id. at 892, 894–95, 906. 
 51 Id. at 895–96. 
 52 Id. at 892. 
 53 Id. at 895. 
 54 Id. at 904. 
 55 Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 
IND. L.J. 1397, 1400–01 (1999). 
 56 Id. at 1403. 
 57 Id. at 1401, 1409. 
 58 Id. 
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the norm as appropriate state behavior.59 Taking into consideration 
Koh’s conjecture, this study theorizes that internalized norms—norms 
that have gone through “vertical domestication”—do not require legal 
regimes to elicit compliance but that emerging norms require 
legalization—the “horizontal legal process”—for full compliance. 
To elaborate, this study contends that the extent to which 
varying levels of legal commitment generate public support for 
compliance with a human rights norm depends on the life cycle of the 
particular human rights norm. Established human rights norms, 
because they have been internalized by the people, do not need 
stronger legal commitments to generate public support for 
compliance, but emerging human rights norms benefit from strong 
state commitments in eliciting public support for compliance because 
the public otherwise may not demand compliance with emerging 
norms. Stronger legal commitments should increase the likelihood of 
compliance for emerging norms. In other words, established human 
rights that have passed Finnemore and Sikkink’s “tipping point”60 or 
have completed Koh’s “vertical” legal process61 will not necessarily 
benefit from high obligation, but norms that have not done so should 
benefit from strong state commitments. The strength of a state’s legal 
commitment to a human rights norm and the life cycle of that norm 
should have substitutable effects in fostering public support for 
compliance. The divergent findings in the domestic compliance 
mechanism literature should be due to the fact that certain norms are 
not well-established, requiring laws of high obligation to elicit public 
support, but other human rights norms are well-established such that 
laws of high obligation are unnecessary. 
Before continuing further, the scope of this study’s theory 
should be clarified. It is theoretically possible that legalization or strong 
legal commitments may lead to greater norm internalization. That is, a 
multitude of states making strong legal commitments to observe a 
norm can lead to a norm cascade through which the meaning of the 
norm is crystallized and is generally accepted as good practice. At the 
                                               
 59 Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 625–26 (1998). 
 60 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 46, at 892–93. 
 61 Koh, supra note 55, at 1406. 
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same time, it is possible that internalization also leads to legalization. 
In that sense, these two concepts could be serially causal. The causal 
relationship between legalization and internalization offer promising 
paths for future research, but the focus of this study is to understand 
the conditional effects of internalization and legalization on public 
support for compliance. 
Given this paper’s theory, this study empirically tests whether 
emerging human right norms that are not yet internalized benefit from 
laws of high obligation in generating public support for compliance, 
more so than norms that are internalized. In doing so, this study’s 
theory and empirics seek to better inform resource-constrained 
policymakers and human rights activists whether to concentrate their 
resources on legalizing norms that are emerging rather than norms that 
are internalized. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
A. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
In order to test whether the life cycle of norms and the level of 
state commitment conditionally elicit public support for human rights 
norms, this study uses an original survey experiment. In the 
experiment, a single human rights norm was framed as an emerging 
norm or an internalized norm depending on the treatment assignment. 
Experimentally manipulating the life cycle of the norm as emerging or 
internalized across treatment conditions by framing the norm as such, 
differences in the responses could be attributed to the level of norm 
internalization. The key was ensuring that respondents did not reject 
the treatment and instead accepted the life cycle of the norm as 
indicated in the treatment condition. That is, it was imperative that if 
the treatment said a particular norm was emerging, respondents treated 
the norm as in fact emerging, and that if the treatment said a particular 
norm was internalized, respondents treated the norm as internalized. 
To meet such expectations, the experiment used the responsibility to 
protect (R2P) as the human rights norm to be tested because R2P is 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:2 
352 
commonly perceived to be at the edge of its tipping point and could 
be justifiably framed as either emerging or internalized.62 
On one hand, R2P could be considered an internalized human 
rights norm; in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) developed the concept of R2P to help 
justify humanitarian interventions in the wake of the genocides in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica.63 The driving motif of R2P, as put forth by 
the ICISS, was “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to 
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass 
murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling 
or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader 
community of states.”64 The norm gained traction in March 2005 when 
then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report entitled In 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 
which highlighted the collective responsibility to protect.65 In 2005, at 
the UN World Summit, over 170 heads of state unanimously adopted 
the outcome of the General Assembly Resolution 60/1 recognizing 
the responsibility of individual states to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity 
and the responsibility of the international community to step in when 
necessary.66 Together, they recognized the need to respond to mass 
atrocities such as genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
ethnic cleansing but not to step in and respond to more general human 
rights violations.67 Regarded as the crowning achievement of the 2005 
UN World Summit, R2P could be considered one of the organizing 
                                               
 62 Text analysis of open ended responses suggest that respondents did in 
fact accept their treatment conditions. 
 63 GARETH EVANS ET AL., INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 11 (2001), 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
 64 Id. at viii. 
 65 U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, 5, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add.3 (May 26, 2005). 
 66 G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 67 Id. ¶ 139. 
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principles for peace and security in the UN system and thus a well-
established, internalized human rights norm.68 
However, on the other hand, none of the aforementioned 
international agreements can be regarded as a binding international 
law, as defined by Article 38 of the 1946 Statute of the International 
Court of Justice.69 The following discussion on the ambiguities in the 
documents suggests continuing disagreements about what R2P entails, 
indicating that R2P has yet to reach a norm cascade. In brief, not only 
is it an open question as to how effective Resolution 60/1 will be in 
preventing mass atrocities, but it is also unclear whether states will be 
compelled to act on the grounds of R2P.70 Contrasting conceptions of 
R2P enjoy support from varying segments of the international order, 
and its meaning as a normative concept could be considered to still be 
in flux.71 To elaborate, Resolution 60/1 does not specify the means 
through which states are to exercise their responsibility. 72 
Humanitarian assistance, economic assistance, and military 
engagement are all possible.73 While many assume R2P justifies and 
calls for military intervention, in 2005, then U.S. Ambassador to the 
UN John Bolton stated that the U.S. considers R2P a “moral 
responsibility” of the international community to “use appropriate 
diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to 
help protect populations” rather than military means.74 Second, the 
criterion that is supposed to trigger a foreign intervention, which is 
defined simply as when the state is “manifestly failing” to protect its 
citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
                                               
 68  Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal 
Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 100–01 (2007). 
 69 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, Apr. 18, 1946, 3 
U.S.T. 1153. 
 70 See Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders, 12 HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 1, 32 (2012). 
 71 Stahn, supra note 68, at 102. 
 72 G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 66, ¶¶ 138–139. 
 73 Stahn, supra note 68, at 104. 
 74 Id. at 108 (citing Letter from Ambassador Bolton to UN Member States 
Conveying U.S. Amendments to the Draft Outcome Document Being Prepared for 
the High Level Event on Responsibility to Protect, at 2 (Aug. 30, 2005), 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05[1].p
df). 
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against humanity, is not specified further.75 Third, the UN Security 
Council is the only body explicitly permitted to authorize intervention, 
and the Resolution does not make clear whether the General 
Assembly, regional organizations, or a coalition of states could act if 
the Security Council failed to act. 76  Fourth, whether R2P as a 
“responsibility” signifies a positive duty to act is unclear. Resolution 
60/1 indicates that states will be “prepared to take collective action . . . 
on a case-by-case basis,” which cautiously phrases the unwillingness of 
UN member states to commit to a positive duty to act in light of mass 
atrocities. 77  Former Associate Legal Officer of the International 
Criminal Court Carsten Stahn writes, 
The concept of responsibility to protect may gradually replace 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in the course of the twenty-
first century. However, at present, many of the propositions of this 
concept remain uncertain from a normative point of view or lack 
support. Responsibility to protect is thus in many ways still a political 
catchword rather than a legal norm. Further fine-tuning and 
commitment by states will be required for it to develop into an 
organizing principle for international society.78 
Thus, skeptics of R2P may argue that the human rights norm 
is still emerging and has yet to reach its tipping point. According to 
such views, the ambiguities and varying interpretations of Resolution 
60/1 reflect the ongoing struggle to reach a norm cascade. 
Overall, Stahn perhaps best summarizes the debatable state of 
R2P’s life cycle by writing that “[s]ome of the features of the concept 
(R2P) are actually well embedded in contemporary international law, 
while others are so innovative that it may be premature to speak of a 
crystallizing practice.”79 Thus, by taking advantage of the uncertain 
state of R2P’s internalization, the study tests whether experimentally 
varying levels of commitment to two different frames of R2P (i.e., 
framing R2P as an emerging norm or R2P as an internalized norm) 
                                               
 75 G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 66, ¶ 139; see also Stahn, supra note 68, at 117. 
 76 Stahn, supra note 68, at 109, 117–18, 120. 
 77 G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 66, ¶ 139. 
 78 Stahn, supra note 68, at 120. 
 79 Id. at 110. 
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results in significant differences in domestic support to abide by R2P, 
without risking treatment rejection. 
B. Survey Design 
In terms of actual survey design, all respondents first read a 
hypothetical about an armed group attacking civilians. Respondents 
were then randomly assigned to one of five treatments conditions (i.e., 
a 2 x 2 design with a control treatment): a control treatment of no 
information, a hard law internalized norm treatment condition, hard 
law emerging norm treatment condition, soft law internalized norm 
treatment condition, and a soft law emerging norm treatment 
condition. All respondents were then asked to state their level of 
support for compliance with R2P. The exact survey text was as follows. 
According to reports by U.S. intelligence officers and 
independent investigative reporters, we now have 
conclusive evidence that an armed group is attacking 
civilians in several Southeast Asian countries. This 
armed group has ties to radical separatists in Indonesia. 
[Control treatment: No information] 
[Hard law and internalized norm treatment:] The 
United States previously signed an international treaty 
in which the U.S. made a commitment to protect 
civilians from such attacks under a well-established 
idea called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
According to this well-established idea, the 
international community has a responsibility to take 
measures to protect civilians and pursue violent armed 
groups in instances of mass atrocities, measures that 
include the use of force. 
[Hard law emerging norm treatment]: The United 
States has previously signed an international treaty in 
which the U.S. made a commitment to protect civilians 
from such attacks under a new idea called the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this new 
idea, some claim that the international community has 
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a responsibility to take measures to protect civilians 
and pursue violent armed groups in instances of mass 
atrocities, measures that include the use of force. 
[Soft law internalized norm treatment:] The United 
States previously participated in a regional meeting that 
suggested general guidelines to protect civilians from 
such attacks under a well-established idea called the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this well-
established idea, the international community has a 
responsibility to take measures to protect civilians and 
pursue violent armed groups in instances of mass 
atrocities, measures that include the use of force. 
[Soft law emerging norm treatment:] The United States 
previously participated in a regional meeting that 
suggested general guidelines to protect civilians from 
such attacks under a new idea called the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P). According to this new idea, some 
claim that the international community has a 
responsibility to take measures to protect civilians and 
pursue violent armed groups in instances of mass 
atrocities, measures that include the use of force. 
Pursuing the armed group would result in U.S. military 
involvement in Southeast Asia and pose another 
significant cost to the national budget. Considering the 
circumstances, do you approve or disapprove of the 
U.S. taking military measures to go after the armed 
group? 
 Strongly approve 
 Approve 
 Somewhat approve 
 Neither approve nor disapprove 
 Somewhat disapprove 
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 Disapprove 
 Strongly disapprove 
The control treatment of no information left ambiguous the 
existence of the norm and international law. In that sense, the 
treatment did not represent a strict “no commitment” treatment. This 
study nonetheless used such a control treatment in light of existing 
studies that rely on equivalent control conditions of no information to 
attain a baseline measure for comparisons with the four active 
treatment conditions.80 
C. Hypotheses 
On the one hand, if the surveys revealed that a strong or weak 
state commitment to R2P resulted in similar shifts in public support 
for compliance, regardless of whether R2P was framed as emerging or 
internalized, then the result would challenge the scholarly emphasis 
placed on obligation. On the other hand, if varying levels of 
commitment to an emerging norm resulted in varying levels of public 
support but did not result in varying levels of support for an 
established norm, then the results would further validate the scholarly 
emphasis placed on obligation. Such a result would simultaneously 
demonstrate the power of international human rights treaties to 
generate public support for compliance when the norm is less 
established. Based on this study’s theoretical conjectures, the 
experiment tested the following hypotheses concerning potential 
differences between each active treatment and the control treatment. 
H1: When R2P is framed as an emerging norm, a high 
level of obligation to R2P will result in higher public 
support for compliance with R2P than no information. 
                                               
 80 See generally Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3; 
Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3. An alternative research 
design would have been specifying that such a norm did not exist or explicitly 
mention the absence of any international law. This alternative design would have 
result in an unrealistic level of deception given the state of R2P. The no information 
treatment instead offered the most reasonable alternative. 
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H2: When R2P is framed as an emerging norm, a low 
level of obligation to R2P will not result in higher 
public support for compliance with R2P than no 
information. 
H3: When R2P is framed as an internalized norm, a 
high level of obligation to R2P will result in higher 
public support for compliance with R2P than no 
information. 
H4: When R2P is framed as an internalized norm, a 
low level of obligation to R2P will result in higher 
public support for compliance with R2P than no 
information. 
The above comparisons are susceptible to a multiple testing 
problem because each active treatment condition varied two key 
variables relative to the control treatment (i.e., obligation and 
internalization). To allay this multiple testing concern, the study also 
tested two additional hypotheses in regards to differences in public 
support after conditioning on the level of norm internationalization. 
The two hypotheses thus contrasted pairs of active treatments, rather 
than contrasting each active treatment against the control treatment. 
Figure 1 helps paint a picture of the hypothesized strength of public 
support for compliance among the active treatment conditions. 
H5: When R2P is framed as an emerging norm, a high 
level of obligation to R2P will result in higher public 
support for compliance with R2P than a low level of 
obligation. 
H6: When R2P is framed as an internalized norm, a 
high level of obligation to R2P will not result in higher 
public support for compliance with R2P than a low 
level of obligation. 
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Figure 1: Hypothesized Public Support for Compliance 
 
 
The survey also collected relevant demographic characteristics 
for later analysis. These included standard demographics used in public 
opinion scholarship, such as age, gender, education level, income, and 
race.81 Other characteristics, also drawn from existing studies, included 
various predispositions such as the respondents’ levels of cooperative 
internationalism, militant internationalism, and isolationism. 82  In 
                                               
 81 See, e.g., Joshua D. Kertzer et al., Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape 
Foreign Policy Attitudes, 76 J. POL. 825, 18 (2014); Wallace, International Law and Public 
Attitudes, supra note 3, at 123. 
 82 See Kertzer, supra note 81, at 18. 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:2 
360 
addition, the survey measured respondents’ political ideology, 
knowledge level, employment status, and political activism. However, 
due to the randomization of the treatment assignment, statistical 
models involving covariates are not necessary for estimating unbiased 
treatment effects.83 As such, the main models in the following analyses 
do not include the covariates, and models controlling for covariates are 
included only as robustness checks in the Appendix. 
D. Comparative Country Case Selection 
The study tested whether varying commitments to two 
separate frames of R2P resulted in differences in public support for 
compliance in both the U.S. and South Korea. Past studies focusing 
exclusively on American public opinion, and some scholars have 
voiced concerns that this tendency has resulted in an “America-
specific” understanding of public opinion and international relations.84 
The following discussion makes evident that this concern is especially 
pronounced in public opinion research on international law given how 
the U.S. occupies an idiosyncratic role in the international legal order. 
First of all, no other state in the world promotes civil liberties as 
robustly as the U.S. does, yet the U.S. has a uniquely strong aversion 
to international laws guaranteeing essentially the same civil liberties.85 
For example, despite strong domestic statutes guaranteeing the rights 
of children in the U.S., the U.S. has yet to ratify the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which guarantees essentially the same rights and 
has been ratified by every state in the UN with the exception of only 
two states: the U.S. and Somalia.86 
It is easy to see why many of the reasons behind America’s 
disinclination for ratifying international law could in turn cause the 
                                               
 83  See, e.g., Diana C. Mutz & Robin Pemantle, Standards for Experimental 
Research: Encouraging a Better Understanding of Experimental Methods, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
POL. SCI. 192 (2015); Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3. 
 84  See Jonathan Renshon et al., Democratic Leaders, Crises and War: Paired 
Experiments on the Israeli Knesset and Public (Research Paper, 2016), 9, 
https://people.fas.harvard.edu/~jkertzer/Research_files/DemocraciesWarCrises-
website.pdf. 
 85  See ANDREW MORAVCSIK, THE PARADOX OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS 
POLICY 147–48 (2005). 
 86 Id. at 148. 
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American public to react to ratified international law in a unique way 
that does not reflect how the rest of the world reacts to international 
law. To elaborate, Professor Andrew Moravcsik of Princeton 
University, who authored THE PARADOX OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS 
POLICY, argues that the U.S. is skeptical of ratifying international 
human rights treaties because it is geopolitically powerful.87 Simply put, 
Moravcsik’s claim is that a state is less likely to support multilateral 
institutions such as human rights treaties if it possesses strong 
unilateral bargaining power. 88  Furthermore, the U.S. also has a 
decentralized political system that allows small veto groups such as 
conservative political elites to derail the ratification process.89 These 
factors that contribute to the U.S.’s strong aversion to ratifying 
international human rights law may lead to unique public reactions 
regarding compliance with international human rights norms post-
ratification. The American public may react in an atypical manner 
because they are fully aware that their own state is the most powerful 
state in the world and because a strong contingent of political elites 
regularly complicates the ratification of international law. For instance, 
the fact that an international human rights treaty has been ratified may 
cause Americans to support compliance more so than citizens of other 
countries because Americans may assume that the particular human 
rights norm is extraordinarily important to have successfully passed 
such a high bar for ratification in the U.S. Americans may believe that 
human rights norms that are sufficiently important to be codified into 
international law should be complied with. If so, generalizing the 
findings from a survey of Americans to other states with a lower bar 
for treaty ratification would be premature. This study’s use of another 
state thus allows for more generalizable insights into the effect of 
international human rights law on public opinion. 
In many ways, South Korea serves as an ideal contrast to the 
U.S. for these purposes. First, South Korea does not share the same 
geopolitical dominance as the U.S. South Korea is arguably not even a 
dominant regional power, and so it does not have the unilateral 
bargaining power that allows states such as the U.S. to forego 
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multilateral agreements. Unsurprisingly, South Korea has ratified more 
international human rights treaties than the U.S. has ratified. 90 The 
relatively lower bar for ratification in South Korea allows this study to 
test whether the sheer frequency of human rights treaties dilutes the 
impact of international human rights law in eliciting strong public 
support for compliance. 
Furthermore, although East Asian states generally ratify 
numerous international human rights treaties, these treaties appear to 
hold little weight among the political elite who have refused to uphold 
“Western-style” human rights by citing the need for economic 
development and social harmony. 91  East Asian states often view 
human rights treaties as Western conceptions of human rights that 
require adjustments in both shape and content to become more 
congruent with existing values and beliefs.92 Some have argued that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other UN documents are 
treated as “dead letters” in East Asia, despite having been ratified by 
the requisite number of countries both in and outside of Asia. 93 
Therefore, South Korea provides an apt comparison to study the 
applicability of the domestic compliance mechanism in a region where 
international human rights law stands on questionable legitimacy. 
Similar results in South Korea and the U.S. would increase confidence 
in this study’s overall findings, but differences between the two 
countries would highlight the need for future scholars to conduct 
studies outside the U.S. in order to develop a more accurate 
understanding of international law and public opinion. 
                                               
 90  Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. COMM’N H.R., 
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
 91 See JOANNE R. BAUER & DANIEL A. BELL, THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1999). 
 92  See SALLY E. MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: 
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 1957 (2006); Amitav 
Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239, 245 (2004). 
 93 See WALTER LAQUEUR & BARRY RUBIN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 
195 (1990). 
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E. Sample Demographics 
The two surveys involved a total of 1,098 American citizens 
and 1,000 South Korean citizens. 94  Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(hereinafter MTurk) hosted the survey of Americans on October 22 
and 23, 2016, and the South Korean professional polling firm 
Macromill Embrain hosted the survey of South Koreans from 
November 16 to 22, 2016. Generally, American MTurk samples are 
not representative and tend to over-represent younger, liberal, lower 
income individuals while under-representing Hispanics and African 
Americans. 95  The U.S. sample used in this survey over-represents 
younger individuals and liberals as well. Fortunately, studies on MTurk 
for the most part replicate studies that use nationally representative 
samples. 96  On the other hand, the South Korean polling firm 
Macromill Embrain administered the Korean-language version of the 
survey to a nationally representative sample in South Korea.97 
IV. RESULTS 
Do the degrees of legal obligation and the norm’s life cycle 
affect whether the public will support compliance with R2P? The 
following figure and table summarize findings from the U.S. and South 
Korean surveys using ordinary least squares (OLS) models, which are 
the typical linear regression models used for empirical research.98 The 
three treatment conditions that were hypothesized to have a 
statistically significant effect compared to the control treatment did 
have a statistically significant effect. A high level of commitment to an 
internalized norm, a low level of commitment to an internalized norm, 
                                               
 94 The tables in the Appendix provide further information regarding the 
samples. 
 95 See Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental 
Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 357–59 (2012). 
 96 Id. at 352. 
 97 For South Koreans, the survey text was translated to reflect the general 
tone and wording of the English version of the survey to the greatest extent possible. 
The Appendix provides the exact text for the U.S. survey and the South Korean 
survey. 
 98 See e.g., ALAN AGRESTI, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES 
262 (2018). 
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and a high level of commitment to an emerging norm all resulted in 
statistically significant increases in public support for compliance 
compared to the control treatment of no information. Meanwhile, a 
low level of commitment to an emerging norm did not result in a 
significant increase in public support for compliance.99 
Figure 2: Average Treatment Effects 
 
 
Table 1: U.S. and South Korea Survey Results (OLS) 
 
 
                                               
 99 Proportional odds models often used for Likert scale responses resulted 
in the same findings for these models and all subsequent models. All of the models 
have been reproduced in the Appendix. 
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To test the fifth and sixth hypotheses, the study next used an 
OLS model after dropping the control condition to compare responses 
among the active treatments. As the following figure and table show, 
when the norm is emerging, a high level of obligation resulted in a 
statistically significant increase in public support for compliance in 
both the U.S. and South Korea. These results suggest that when a 
norm is emerging, a high level of obligation, as opposed to a low level 
of obligation, will result in a statistically significant increase in public 
support for compliance with the norm. Meanwhile, the study also finds 
that a high level of obligation to an internalized norm does not always 
result in stronger public support for compliance with R2P than a low 
a level of obligation. For U.S. respondents, the level of obligation 
makes a difference by generating greater public support, even when 
the norm is already internalized, but it does not for South Korean 
respondents. Therefore, the study finds support for the fifth 
hypothesis and some support for the sixth hypothesis. 
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Table 2: Marginal Treatment Effects of Higher Obligation (OLS) 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
When conditioning on an emerging norm, the level of 
obligation is significant in shifting public support for compliance in the 
U.S. and in South Korea. Human rights advocates and policymakers 
thus have an incentive to make stronger legal commitments to 
emerging norms in both states. However, when conditioning on an 
internalized norm, the level of obligation causes a statistically 
significant increase in public support for compliance only in the U.S., 
not in South Korea. Given that stronger legal commitments fail to 
create additional public support for compliance in South Korea, South 
Korean policymakers have little incentive to make stronger legal 
commitments, as opposed to weak commitments, to internalized 
norms for the purposes of eliciting increased public support. American 
policymakers, however, do have an incentive to legalize internalized 
norms as stronger legal commitments will engender even greater public 
support for compliance in the U.S. 
The results seem to suggest that South Koreans are more 
preoccupied with the level of norm internalization and are less legalistic 
in their approach to compliance. Their concern may be with 
international normative traditions and not necessarily with whether 
their state has made a strong legal commitment. Meanwhile, the U.S. 
seems to be more legalistic in their approach to compliance, yielding 
stronger public support for compliance even when the norm is well-
established. These conjectures are in accordance with common 
presumptions about the more legalistic approach the U.S. takes to 
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international law as well the challenges international law still faces in 
East Asia, as noted above. Unfortunately, it is not possible, given the 
experimental design, to test the above conjectures or a variety of other 
contextual circumstances that could be driving the cross-national 
differences. At the very least, this study’s findings illustrate the need to 
venture beyond the U.S. when studying public opinion and the need 
to adopt a multi-state approach to legal scholarship on international 
law. 
VI. CAUSAL MECHANISMS 
By randomly assigning vignettes that vary the level of state 
commitment to R2P, differences in responses can be directly attributed 
to the strength of the legal commitment, after holding constant the 
level of norm internalization. However, it is unclear as to why a 
stronger legal obligation is causing differences in responses. What 
about strong legal commitments elicit increased public support for 
compliance? Why does the public care about strong legal commitments 
enough to support compliance? What are the causal mechanisms 
through which strong legal commitments prompt public support for 
compliance? 
Theoretically, a stronger level of commitment to an 
international norm could have encouraged compliance because 
respondents feared the reputation costs of noncompliance.100 Once 
respondents were made aware of a strong state commitment to R2P, 
they may have found it important to honor that commitment because 
                                               
 100 There is a long line of research on reputation costs motivating state 
behavior. See, e.g., DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR AND THE 
PRESERVATION OF PEACE (1996); JOSHUA D. KERTZER, RESOLVE IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2016); RICHARD LEBOW, WHY NATIONS FIGHT: PAST 
AND FUTURE MOTIVES FOR WAR (2008); JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1996); MORROW, supra note 17; BARRY O’NEILL, 
HONOR, SYMBOLS, AND WAR (1996); THOMAS SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 
(1996); Allan Dafoe et al., Reputation and Status and Motives for War, 17 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 371 (2014); Paul Huth, Reputation and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Assessment, 7 SEC. STUD. 72 (1997); Shiping Tang, Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and 
International Conflict, 14 SEC. STUD. 34 (2004); Alex Weisiger & Keren Yarhi-Milo, 
Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics, 69 INT’L ORG. 473 
(2015). 
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they feared that inaction would create a reputation for noncompliance, 
which could in turn cause other states to become more hesitant when 
making future agreements with the U.S. The weak commitment 
treatment, in contrast, may have been less likely to elicit the same 
degree of reputational concerns. 
In order to study why strong legal commitments were 
generating greater public support for compliance than weak legal 
commitments, the survey asked open-ended questions to all U.S. 
respondents about why they chose to support or oppose compliance 
with R2P.101 Using these responses, the study first cataloged common 
words—referred to as “topics”—mentioned in the responses and 
observed which topics appeared more or less frequently across 
different treatment conditions.102 
The study focused on several quantities of interest from text 
analysis, which are summarized in the following two figures: one figure 
that examines the mechanisms through which varying levels of legal 
obligation had an effect when the norm was emerging and another figure 
for when the norm was internalized. Each figure first reports the prevalence 
of different topics (i.e., corpus proportions) in the two treatment 
groups being compared, the low obligation treatment group and the 
high obligation treatment group. Topics that represent a coherent 
                                               
 101 Due to the increased costs of conducting extended surveys necessary text 
analyses, the study only fielded extended surveys of U.S. respondents. 
 102  More specifically, first the survey asked respondents to explain their 
decision in a few sentences. Second, the responses were subset by each treatment 
group. Next, using a structural topic model, the study uncovered common topics or 
rationales that occurred in multiple responses and determined which treatment 
conditions were more likely to trigger certain topics in the responses. Due to the 
constraints of unsupervised machine learning, the number of topics had to be 
specified beforehand. To minimize the possibility of researcher-induced bias in the 
specification of the number of topics, the study used the “manyTopics” package in 
R, which is a statistical software program used for text analysis. The program 
processed multiple outputs from a structural topic model and selected the most 
optimal run of the model in terms of exclusivity and semantic coherence. For a more 
detailed description of the methodology, see generally Molly E. Roberts et al., 
Structural Topic Models for Open-Ended Survey Responses, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1082 (2014). 
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meaning are identified with a topic label in the figures below. Topics 
that have little semantic meaning are left unlabeled. 
Second, the figures each report the prevalence of certain topics 
depending on treatment assignment. That is, each figure notes whether 
high obligation is more likely to trigger a particular rationale to justify 
the respondents’ stance than the low obligation treatment. Finally, the 
figures depict sample responses from select topics to further illustrate 
the causal mechanism a particular topic represented. 
The figure below is text analysis of open-ended responses 
provided by the low obligation treatment group and the high obligation 
treatment group for an emerging norm. Topics 1, 3, and 4 did not have 
a useful semantic meaning.103 Topic 2, on the other hand, described 
the theorized reputation mechanism. As the top-right panel of the 
figure shows, respondents in the high obligation treatment group were 
more likely than the low obligation treatment group to mention 







                                               
 103 Topic 4 may be of interest given its strong statistical significance. It 
contained reasoning somewhat resembling isolationist sentiments. This sentiment 
was likely felt across all respondents, but the high obligation treatment overrode such 
sentiments while the low obligation treatment allowed such sentiments to be 
expressed. Topic 4 was described as lacking a useful meaning in the text above for 
clarity, especially since such sentiments were not a causal mechanism through which 
the control treatment was having an effect but rather an expression of underlying 
attitudes. 
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Figure 4: Emerging Soft Law Treatment v. Emerging Hard Law Treatment 
 
 
 The next figure is text analysis of open-ended responses 
provided by the low obligation treatment group and the high obligation 
treatment group for an internalized norm. The results mirror the 
results from the emerging norm treatment conditions. Again, as the 
top-right panel of the figure shows, respondents in the high obligation 
treatment group were more likely than the low obligation treatment 
group to mention reputation as the reason for their stance. 
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For the most part, text analysis suggests that reputational 
concerns were driving greater support for compliance with R2P in the 
high obligation treatment group compared to the low obligation 
treatment group, regardless of norm internalization. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Does state commitment to an international human rights norm 
shift public support for compliance with that norm? This question lies 
at the foundation of several domestic compliance mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, previous experimental studies on public opinion 
towards international law have resulted in mixed findings.104 This study 
incorporates the life cycle of norms to arrive at a more accurate 
understanding of when and how state commitment to international 
human rights norms, specifically R2P, elicits public support for 
compliance. By leveraging surveys in the U.S. and South Korea, the 
study finds that when R2P is framed as an internalized norm, a strong 
level of commitment does not always lead to greater public demand 
for compliance than a weak commitment. The fact that R2P is 
internalized may preclude the additive effects of stronger international 
legal commitments in eliciting public support for compliance. 
However, when R2P is framed as an emerging norm, the level of legal 
commitment is crucial in shifting public support. A strong legal 
commitment to an emerging norm will elicit greater public support for 
compliance than a weak legal commitment, and it will do so by raising 
reputational concerns. 
The study has several practical implications for the future of 
R2P. First, the manner in which policymakers and norm entrepreneurs 
present R2P and other human rights norms may have a profound 
impact on how the public perceives the norm and whether constituents 
are willing to support state compliance. Second, whether states make a 
strong or weak legal commitment to R2P matters in shaping domestic 
public opinion, especially if the public perceives R2P to be an emerging 
norm. To elicit support from those who consider R2P to be emerging 
rather than established, R2P proponents may benefit from convincing 
their state to make a high level of commitment to the norm. 
                                               
 104 Compare Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3, 
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3, Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3, Tomz, supra note 
3, and Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3, with Chilton, The Laws of 
War, supra note 3, Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3, and Wallace, International Law and 
Public Attitudes, supra note 3.  
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Third, there are cross-national differences that proponents of 
R2P should be aware of. An American policymaker hoping to elicit 
greater public support for compliance with R2P from segments of the 
populace that already consider the norm to be internalized still benefits 
from securing a stronger legal commitment relative to a weaker 
commitment. However, this does not hold true for South Korean 
policymakers whose constituents are not more likely to be moved by a 
stronger state commitment to what they already perceive to be an 
established norm. Given the cross-national differences, testing human 
rights norms other than R2P and doing so in different regions to 
uncover potential regional differences offer promising paths forward 
for future scholars. 
Finally, using text analysis, the study shows that stronger legal 
commitments are effective in eliciting public support for compliance 
because American respondents are more likely to believe that the 
reputation of the state is at stake when a strong commitment has been 
made to abide by R2P. On a broader methodological note for future 
legal and public opinion scholars, this study makes evident the 
promising potential of text analysis to enrich findings drawn from 
public opinion surveys. Scholars should consider, despite the increased 
costs, the benefits of including open-ended questions within their 
surveys for similar analyses of causal mechanisms. 
In closing, the demonstrated shifts in public support for 
compliance with R2P seems to justify the scholarly emphasis placed on 
legal obligation and domestic compliance mechanisms, but future 
research on public opinion and human rights norms should take into 
account the life cycle of the underlying norms and regional differences 
when attempting to understand whether international legal 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY TEXT 
[For U.S. respondents:] 
According to reports by U.S. intelligence officers and independent 
investigative reporters, we now have conclusive evidence that an 
armed group is attacking civilians in several Southeast Asian countries. 
This armed group has ties to radical separatists in Indonesia. 
[Control treatment: No information] 
[Hard law and internalized norm treatment:] The United States 
previously signed an international treaty in which the U.S. made a 
commitment to protect civilians from such attacks under a well-
established idea called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According 
to this well-established idea, the international community has a 
responsibility to take measures to protect civilians and pursue violent 
armed groups in instances of mass atrocities, measures that include the 
use of force. 
[Hard law and emerging norm treatment:] The United States has 
previously signed an international treaty in which the U.S. made a 
commitment to protect civilians from such attacks under a new idea 
called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this new idea, 
some claim that the international community has a responsibility to 
take measures to protect civilians and pursue violent armed groups in 
instances of mass atrocities, measures that include the use of force. 
[Soft law and internalized norm treatment:] The United States 
previously participated in a regional meeting that suggested general 
guidelines to protect civilians from such attacks under a well-
established idea called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According 
to this well-established idea, the international community has a 
responsibility to take measures to protect civilians and pursue violent 
armed groups in instances of mass atrocities, measures that include the 
use of force. 
[Soft law and emerging norm treatment:]The United States previously 
participated in a regional meeting that suggested general guidelines to 
protect civilians from such attacks under a new idea called the 
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this new idea, some 
claim that the international community has a responsibility to take 
measures to protect civilians and pursue violent armed groups in 
instances of mass atrocities, measures that include the use of force. 
Pursuing the armed group would result in U.S. military involvement in 
Southeast Asia and pose another significant cost to the national 
budget. Considering the circumstances, do you approve or disapprove 
of the U.S. taking military measures to go after the armed group? 
 Strongly approve 
 Approve 
 Somewhat approve 
 Neither approve nor disapprove 
 Somewhat disapprove 
 Disapprove 
 Strongly disapprove 
Please write a couple sentences to explain your opinion. Your opinion 
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[For Korean respondents (in the original Korean):] 
한국 정보기관의 정보와 독립적인 전문 기자들의 보도에 
의하면, 동남아시아 몇 나라에서 한 무장단체가 민간인들을 
공격하고 있다는 확실한 증거가 있다. 이 무장단체는 
인도네시아의 급진적인 분리주의자들과 연계되어 있다. 
[Control treatment: No commitment] 
[Hard law and established norm treatment:] 우리 나라는 예전에 
R2P(보호할 책임)라 불리는 국제적으로 확고부동한 
규범(관례)에 따라 한국은 민간인들을 보호하기 위해 
공식적으로 법적인 책임진다는 구속력이 있는 국제적인 
조약을 체결하였다. R2P(보호할 책임)는 대중(大衆)에 대한 
잔혹행위와 인권침해를 막지 못하는 국가는 그 국가의 주권을 
박탈당한다는 규범이다. R2P(보호할 책임)는 아주 오랫동안 
국제관계의 초석이 되어 왔다. 국제적으로 확고부동한 이 
규범에 따라, 폭력적인 무장단체의 대량 잔혹행위로부터 
민간인을 보호하기 위하여 국제 사회는 무력을 포함한 여러 
조치를 취할 책임을 갖는다. 우리 나라는 공개적으로 이것을 
약속 했으므로, R2P(보호할 책임)를 법적으로 이행할 책임이 
있다. 
[Hard law and emerging norm treatment:] 우리 나라는 예전에 
R2P(보호할 책임)라 불리는 논란 중에 있는 새로운 개념에 따라 
한국은 민간인들을 보호하기 위해 공식적으로 법적인 
책임진다는 구속력이 있는 국제적인 조약을 체결하였다. 
R2P(보호할 책임)라는 새로운 개념에 따라, 국제 사회는 대중에 
대한 잔혹행위로부터 시민을 보호하고, 그런 폭력적인 
무장단체를 소탕하기 위한 군사적 조치를 할 책임을 가지고 
있다고 일부 사람들은 주장한다. 우리 나라는 공개적으로 
이것을 약속 했으므로, R2P(보호할 책임)를 법적으로 이행할 
책임이 있다. 
[Soft law and established norm treatment:] 우리 나라는 예전에 
R2P(보호할 책임)라 불리는 국제적으로 확고부동한 
규범(관례)에 따라 민간인들을 보호하기 위한 가이드라인을 
제안한 동북아 국제 회의에 참석한 적이 있다. R2P(보호할 
책임)는 대중(大衆)에 대한 잔혹행위와 인권침해를 막지 못하는 
국가는 그 국가의 주권을 박탈당한다는 규범이다. R2P(보호할 
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책임)는 아주 오랫동안 국제관계의 초석이 되어 왔다. 
국제적으로 확고부동한 이 규범에 따라, 폭력적인 무장단체의 
대량 잔혹행위로부터 민간인을 보호하기 위하여 국제 사회는 
무력을 포함한 여러 조치를 취할 책임을 갖는다. 
[Soft law and emerging norm treatment:] 우리 나라는 예전에 
R2P(보호할 책임)라 불리는 논란 중에 있는 새로운 개념에 따라 
민간인들을 보호하기 위한 가이드라인을 제안한 동북아 국제 
회의에 참석한 적이 있다. R2P(보호할 책임)라는 새로운 개념에 
따라, 국제 사회는 대중에 대한 잔혹행위로부터 시민을 
보호하고, 그런 폭력적인 무장단체를 소탕하기 위한 군사적 
조치를 할 책임을 가지고 있다고 일부 사람들은 주장한다. 
무장단체를 쫓기 위해서는 동남아시아 지역에 우리 나라 
군사력을 투입해야 하고, 그렇기 때문에 국가의 예산과 국군에 
큰 부담이 된다. 이러한 여건을 감안한다면, 우리 나라가 
무장단체를 소탕하기위해 군사적 조치를 취하는 것에 
동의하십니까? 
 매우 동의 
 동의 
 다소 동의 
 모름 
 다소 반대 
 반대 
 매우 반대 
당신의 의견은 저희에게 매우 중요합니다. 위의 선택을 하신 
이유를 몇 문장으로 설명하시오. 
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APPENDIX B: FULL REGRESSION MODELS 
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